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-judgments should be reversed as to them in order that they 
ma1 have a fair trial on the merits. We held in People v. 
W01l' 47 Cal.2d 311,319 [303 P.2d 329], that "It is axiomatic 
that ~hen an accused is denied that fair and impartial trial 
paranteed by law, such procedure amounts to a denial of 
due process of law (Powell v. Alabama [1932], 287 U.S. 45 
(53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527])." 
3. Since there is no evidence which tends to connect defend-
ants Osslo, McFaden, Meyer and Hazel with the actual 
assault, the trial court should be directed to dismiss as to these 
defendants the charge of assault by means of force likely to 
produce great bodily injury. 
Gibson, C. J., and Traynor, J., concurred. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied April 23, 
1958. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of 
the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
[Crim. No. 6108. In Bank. Mar. 27, 1958.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, V. ELMER TAHTlNEN, 
Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Right to Speedy Trial-Waiver.-The consti-
tutional right to a speedy trial (Const., art. I, § 13) and the 
statutory requirements that criminal cases be set for trial for 
a date not later than 30 days after the entry of defendant's .' 
plea, that criminal cases be given precedence over civil matters 
and proceedings (Pen. Code, § 1050), and that the court, unless 
good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the action dis-
missed where defendant, whose trial has not been postponed 
on his application, is not brought to trial within 60 days after 
the filing of the information (Pen. Code, § 1382, subd. 2), 
may be waived. 
[2] Id.-Appeal-Presumptions-Oontinuance.-Where the record 
does not disclose on whose application the continuances for 
[1] See Oa1.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 128. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,3] Criminal Law, § 246; [2] Criminal 
Law, § 1288; [4, 5, 9, 10] Criminal Law, § 243; [6] Criminal Law, 
§ 248; [7] Criminal Law, § 244; [8] Criminal Law, § 241; [11] 
Arrest, §12; [12] Criminal Law, § 188; (13] Poisons, § 12; [14] 
Poisons, § 15; [15] Criminal Law, § 107. 
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plea and for disposition of a motion to set aside the infor-
mation were granted, but where they were for defendant's 
benefit, they are fairl:y chargeable to him. 
[3] ld.-Right to Speedy Trial-Waiver.-Where the trial of a 
criminal case was set for a date more than 30 days after entry 
of defendant's plea but his counsel did not object to the date 
set, he waived his right to have the trial set for an earlier date. 
(Pen. Code, § 1050.) 
[4] ld.-Time of Trial-Delay Consented to by Defendant.-Where 
the public defender requested a delay from the date set for 
trial to a date some two weeks later because of his crowded 
calendar, and the court asked defendant whether he waived 
trial at an earlier date, to which he gave an affirmative reply, 
defendant consented to the delay and thereby waived any 
right to be tried before the new date. 
[5] ld.-Time of Trial-Delay Consented to by Defendant.-By 
consenting to trial on a date beyond 60 days after the filing of 
the information (Pen. Code, § 1382, subd. 2), a defendant does 
not waive the right to speedy trial thereafter, nor waive the 
requirement that further delay be justified by a showing of 
good cause. 
[6] ld.-Time of Trial-Burden of Excusing Delay.-Where a 
criminal case is postponed on the ground that the congested 
condition of the court's calendar would not permit the trial 
to proceed on the date set, the burden of showing the existence 
of this condition is on the prosecution. 
[7] Id. - Time of Trial- Delay Consented to by Defendant.-
Though a minute notation that a criminal case is continued 
for trial "owing to congested condition of the calendar" 
falls short of establishing that trial could not proceed in 
any department of the superior court, defendant's consent to 
the delay is presumed "'here he did not object to the post-
ponement or move to dismiss the action. 
[8] ld.-Time of Trial-Bect of Mistrial.-With respect to the 
60-day limitation within which to bring a criminal case to trial 
(Pen. Code, § 1382, subd. 2), where there has been a trial and 
a failure to determine defendant's guilt, the time for another 
trial begins to run from the date of the mistrial. . 
[9] ld.-Time of Trial-Delay Consented to by Defendant.-
Where a trial did not proceed on the date se~ owing to the 
People's unpreparedness and a date more than three weeks 
later was the earliest date next available to the court, the 
trial was continued to that date, and the public defender 
accepted the continuance as "satisfactory," such assent to the 
continuance waived defendant's right to complain. 
[10] ld.-Time of Trial-Delay Consented to by Defendant.-
Where defendant's counsel assented to a continuance beyond 
) 
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the 60-day period prescribed by Pen. Code, § 1382, subd. 2, a 
further three-day delay because of the absence of a necessary 
witness for the prosecution did not divest the court of juris-
diction where defendant, who could have insisted that the trial 
then proceed, consented, though reluctantly, to the continuance. 
[11] Arrest-Without Warrant-Reasonable Oause.-Where police 
officers went to the vicinity of a certain person's home in 
reliance on information obtained from three drug addicts that 
they had obtained narcotics from that home and, as the officers 
drove past the house, they observed the furtive conduct of 
defendant indicating that he had purchased narcotics at the 
home and had picked them up at the base of a nearby tree, 
those facts established reasonable cause for defendant's arrest 
without a warrant on the belief that he had the narcotics in bis 
possession (Pen. Code, § 836, subd. 3.) 
[12] Oriminal Law-Arraignment-Rearraignment After MistriaL 
-There is no logical or practical necessity for rearraignment 
after mistrial, and where defendant admitted prior convictions 
. before the mistrial, such admission is conclusive in all subse-
quent proceedings unless withdrawn by consent of the court. 
(Pen. Code, § 1025.) 
[13] Poisons-O:ffenses-IDegal Possession of Narcotics-Indict-
ment and Information.-In a prosecution for unlawful posses-
sion of narcotics, a prior conviction of a misdemeanor viola-
tion of Health & Saf. Code, § 11500, may be charged in the 
information. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11712.) 
[U] Id.-O:ffenses-IDegal Possession of Narcotics-Evidence.-
In a prosecution for unlawful possession of narcotics, defend-
ant could not successfully contend that, inasmuch as the arrest-
ing offieers did not identify him by name but referred to bim 
simply as "the defendant," there was no evidence that be was 
the person who committed the crime, where it was clear from 
the record that he was the person referred to by tbe witnesses. 
[16] Oriminal Law-Rights of Accused-Aid of Oounsel.-Defend-
ant in a narcotics case could not successfully contend tbat 
he was denied effective assistance of counsel by virtue· of the 
fact that, after a mistrial, his counsel was not present when 
the court set a date for retrial, where nothing else occurred 
on that occasion, the date set was well within 60 days after the 
mistrial, defendant did not suggest how he was injured by the 
absence of counsel, and he was represented by counsel at the 
retrial. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Allen T. Lynch, Judge. Affirmed. 
[11] See Oal.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 10; Am.Jur., Arrest, § 48 et seq. 
10 c..acs-. 
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Prosecution for illegal possession of narcotics. Judgnwllt 
of conviction affirmed. 
Elmer Tahtinen, in pro. per., and Albert C. Garber, under 
appointment by the Supreme Court, for Appellant, 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, William E. James and William 
M. Bennett, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The trial court, sitting without a jury 
found defendant guilty of a felony violation of section 11500 
of the Health and Safety Code. It also found that he was 
previously convicted of a felony violation of federal narcotics 
laws and a misdemeanor 'violation of section 11500 of the 
Health and Safety Code and sentenced him to imprisonment 
in the state penitentiary for the term prescribed by law. 
(See Health & Saf. Code, § 11712.) Defendant appeals. 
It is contended at the outset that defendant was deprived 
of his right to a speedy trial. (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 13; 
Pen. Code, §§ 681a, 686, 1050, 1382.) The information was 
filed November 29, 1955. On December 1, 1955 defendant 
appeared for arraignment. The public defender was ap-
pointed to represent him, and the case was continued to 
December 6 for plea. On December 6, defendant by his 
counsel moved to set aside the information (Pen. Code, § 995), 
and the case was continued for disposition of the motion until 
December 21. On December 21 the court denied the motion 
to set aside the information. Defendant pleaded not guilty 
and denied the prior convictions, and trial was set for January 
26, 1956. On January 26, trial was postponed until Febru-
ary 10. On February 10, trial was postponed until February 
14. On February 14, trial was postponed until February 15. 
On February 15, trial was postponed until February 16. On 
February 16, trial was postponed until February 17. On 
February 17, trial was postponed until February 20. On 
February 20, defendant withdrew his former denial and ad-. 
mitted the prior convictions, and trial commenced. On Febru-
ary 21, the jury announced that it was unable to reach a 
verdict, and the court declared a mistrial and continued the 
case to February 24. On February 24 trial was reset for 
March 28. On March 28, defendant waived jury trial and . 
by his counsel stipulated that the case be decided on the 
evidence produced at the preliminary hearing and such other 
testimony as either side might adduce. Trial was continued 
to April 20. On April 20, trial was again continued to April 
) 
) 
)far. 1958] PEOPLE 'V. T AHTINEN [50 C.2d 127; 323 P.2d 442] 131 
23. On April 23, trial was' completed, and the court found 
defendant guilty as charged. 
[1] Section 1050 of the Penal Code provides: "The court 
ahall set all criminal cases for trial for a date not later 
than thirty (30) days after the date of entry of the plea of 
the defendant. No continuance of the trial shall be granted 
except upon affirmative proof in open court, upon reasonable 
notice, that the ends of justice require a continuance. . . . 
Criminal cases shall be given precedence over all civil matters 
and proceedings. If any court is unable to hear all criminal 
eases pending before it within thirty (30) days after the 
respective defendants have entered their pleas, it must imme-
diately notify the Chairman of the Judicial Council." Section 
1382 of the Penal Code provides: "The court, unless good 
eause to the contrary is shown, must order the action to be 
dismissed in the following cases: ... 2. If a defendant, whose 
trial has not been postponed upon his application, is not 
brought to trial in a superior court within sixty days after ... 
filing of the information .... " It is well settled, however, 
that the constitutional right to a speedy trial and the fore-
going statutory requirements may be waived. (Ray v. 8upe-
rior Court, 208 Cal. 357 [281 P. 391] ; People v. Echols, 125 
Cal.App.2d 810, 818 [271 P.2d 595].) 
[2] The record does not disclose upon whose application 
the continuances for plea and for disposition of the motion 
to set aside the information were granted. Since they were 
for defendant's benefit, however, they are fairly chargeable 
to him. 
[3] Trial was set for January 26, 1956, more than 30 days 
after entry of defendant's plea on December 21. It appears, 
therefore, that section 1050 was not complied with. Since 
defendant was represented by counsel, however, and did not 
object to the date set, he waived his right to have the trial 
set for an earlier date. (Ray v. 8upe.rior Court, supra, 208 
Cal. 357, 358; People v. Bradford, 130 Cal.App.2d 606, 607-
608 [279 P.2d 561].) 
[4] The public defender requested the delay from Janu-
ary 26 to February 10 because of his crowded calendar. The 
court asked defendant whether, under the circumstances, he 
waived trial at an earlier date. Defendant answered, "Yes." 
Thus defendant consented to the delay and thereby waived 
any right to be tried before February 10. (In re Lopez, 39 
Cal.2d 118, 120 [245 P.2d 1].) 
[5] By consenting to trial on a date beyond the 60 day 
) 
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period, however, a defendant does not waive the right to 
speedy trial thereafter, nor does he waive the rE'quirement that 
further delay be justified by a showing of good cause therefor. 
(In re Lopez, supra, 39 Ca1.2d at 120.) [6] Defendant con-
tends that the several postponements from February 10 to 
February 20 were not justified. The court's minutes disclose 
that each of these postponements was granted because of the 
"congested condition of the calendar." In I'll re Lopez, supra., 
39 Cal.2d at 120, we held that "where the condition of the 
court's business would not permit the trial to proceed" good 
cause is shown and a continuance is justified. The burden of 
showing the existence of this condition, howf>ver, is npon the 
prosecution (People v. Echols, supra, 125 Ca1.App.2d at 816), 
and on the record before us the prosecution has failed to 
sustain that burden. [7] The minute notation that the case 
is continued for trial "owing to congested condition of the 
calendar" falls short of establishing that trial could not pro-
ceed in any department of the Superior Court of Los AnJ!eles 
County. (Herrick v. Municipal Court, 151 Cal.App.2d 804, 
807 [312 P.2d 264] and cases there cited; People v. Echols, 
supra, 125 Cal.App.2d at 816-817; Pen. Code, § 1050.) Since 
defendant, however, did not object to these postponements or 
move to dismiss the action, his consent to the delay is pre-
sumed. (Ro,y v. Superior Court, supra, 20S Cal. 357, 35S.) 
[8] The People had 60 days from February 21, 1956, the 
date of the mistrial, to bring defendant to trial a second time. 
(People v. A.'ngelopo'ulos, 30 Cal.App.2d 538, 543 [86 P.2d 
873].) On March 28 the transcript of the preliminary hear-
ing was introduced into evidence, and the trial commenced. 
Further continuances had to be grounded on good cause. 
(Pen. Code, § 1050.) [9] The record discloses that the trial 
did not proceed on March 28 owing to the People's unpre-
paredness. Apparently April 20 was the earliest date next 
available to the court, and trial was continued to that date. 
The public defender accepted the continuance as "satisfac-
tory." His counsel's assent to the continuance waived de-
fendant's right to complain. (Ray v. Superior Court, supra, 
208 Cal. 357, 358-359.) 
[10] With respect to the continuance from April 20 to 
April 23, the reporter's transcript reveals the following con-
versation: 
"MR. JACKSON [district attorney] : Your Honor, I think 
I have already indicated that the People are not ready to pro-
t~eed at this time because a necessary witness is not here, 
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Officer Berteaux and Sergeant Vega, his fellow officer, is on 
vacation. I heard from Officer Berteaux a short time ago, and 
it will be about 40 minutes before he can make it, and I 
believe counsel would not have any objection to a continuance 
for one week. 
"THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, may I say something? I 
thought I was entitled to a quick and speedy trial. I have 
been in jail for five months and twelve days already. 
"THE COURT: You have been in jail five months and twelve 
days. That is a long time. There is no question about it. 
"MR. JACKSON: Your Honor, if the defendant insists on 
going to trial here today, we can wait for the officer to be 
here. 
"THE COURT: How abollt continuing it until Monday at 
1:30' 
"MR. BRILL [public defender] : I think that would be more 
satisfactory, your Honor. 
0. 
"THE COURT: Will that be agreeable with you [defendant] , 
"THE DEFENDANT: It will have to be, I guess." 
This conversation reveals that had defendant insisted, trial 
would have proceeded on April 20. Thus, he consented, even 
though reluctantly, to the continuance. 
The most incriminating evidence introduced by the People 
was two packages containing 38 capsules of heroin taken 
from defendant's automobile at the time of his arrest and 
another capsule of heroin taken from his pocket. Defendant 
contends that this evidence should have been excluded as the 
product of an unlawful search. 
The police had separately arrested three persons for nar-
cotics offenses, each of whom, at different times and places, 
informed the police that they had obtained narcotics from one 
Joe Hernandes at his home at 112 East 11lth Street. On 
November 8, 1955, two officers assigned to the narcotics detail 
went to the vicinity of Hernandes' residence. As they drove 
past the house, the officers saw defendant sitting in a 1941 
Buick automobile parked across the street. They knew that 
(lefendant was not Hernandes. The officers drove around the 
block, and when they returned defendant was gone. The 
officers continued to patrol the area. They observed defend-
ant traveling south on Main Street. He turned left on 111th 
Street, parked on the south side of the street, made a U-turn, 
and then parked on the north side, across the street from 
Hernandes' house. Defendant remained in his automobile 
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approximately half an hour and then walked towards Her-
nandes' house. He disappeared into an alley next to the 
house, which Hernandes used as a driveway. After 10 or 15 
minutes defendant returned to his automobile, drove to the 
corner of Main Street and 1Ilth, turned right on Main and 
proceeded north to 110th Street, turned right on llOth and 
drove east to San Pedro Street, turned right on San Pedro 
and proceeded south to 111th Place, drove along ll1th Place 
.and parked just east of the end of the alley that he had 
formerly entered. He opened the car door on the passenger 
side, reached towards the ground at the base of a tree and 
appeared to pick up some object. Defendant then drove away. 
The officers followed him a distance of one to three miles, 
and when defendant stopped at a red light, the officers ap-
proached his automobile, identified themselves and arrested 
him on suspicion of possessing narcotics. A search of the 
automobile disclosed the two packages of heroin. Defendant 
was taken to a nearby gas station and searched. The single 
capsule of heroin was found in his pocket. The officers had 
no search warrant, nor did they have a warrant for de-
fendant's arrest. 
[11] Defendant contends that the officers arrested him 
without reasonable cause to believe that he had committed 
a felony (Pen. Code, § 836, subd. 3), and that therefore the 
search incident to the arrest was illegal. This contention 
cannot be sustained. The information obtained from the three 
persons previously arrested gave the officers reasonable cause 
to believe that narcotics were being sold by Hernandes at his 
residence, and defendant's furtive conduct in the vicinity 
of Hernandes' house gave the officers reasonable cause to be-
lieve that defendant had purchased narcotics and had them 
in his possession. This conduct distinguishes the present case 
from People v. Schra·ier, 141 Cal.App.2d 600 [297 P.2d 81], 
which held that merely leaving a house that had been· under 
surveillance is not sufficient to justify arrest. People v. 
Brown, 45 Ca1.2d 640 [290 P.2d 528], People v. Simon, 45 
Ca1.2d 645 [290 P.2d 531], People v. Yet Ning Yee, 145 Cal. 
App.2d 513 [302 P.2d 616], People v. Harvey, 142 Cal. 
App.2d 728 [299 P.2d 310], and Her1lQndez v. United States, 
17 F.2d 373, cited in appellant's brief are distinguishable on 
like grounds. 
Other contentions were made by defendant in his brief in 
propria persona before this court appointed counsel to repre-
sent him. [12] He contends that since he was not re-
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arraigned after the mistrial, he did not admit the prior con-
victions for purposes of retrial. He cites no authority re-
quiring rearraignment after a mistrial and we have discovered 
none. Nor do we perceive any logical or practical necessity 
for such a procedure. The record plainly discloses that de-
fendant admitted the prior convictions, and seotion 1026 of 
the Penal Code provides that, unless withdrawn by consent 
of the court, such admission is conclusive in all subsequent 
proceedings. 
[13] Defendant's contention that his prior conviction of 
a misdemeanor violation of section 11500 of the Health and 
Safety Code, not being a felony, should not have been charged 
in the information is likewise without merit. (Health & Saf. 
Code, § 11712; see People v. Burke, 47 Ca1.2d 45, 50 [301 
P.2d 241].) 
[14] Neither at the preliminary hearing nor at the trial 
did the arresting officers identify defendant by name. They 
referred to him simply as "the defendant." Defendant 
contends that there is, therefore, no evidence that he is the 
person who committed the crime. It is abundantly clear from 
the record that defendant is the person referred to by the 
witnesses. 
[15] Lastly, defendant contends that he was denied effec-
tive assistance of counsel by virtue of the fact that, after the 
mistrial, when the court set retrial for March 28, 1956, de-
fendant's counsel was not present. The record does not dis-
close the reason for counsel's absence. Nothing occurred on 
this occasion other that the setting of a date for retrial. The 
date set was well within 60 days after the mistrial (see People 
v . .AlIgelopoulos, supra, 30 Cal.App.2d at 543), and defend-
ant does not suggest how he was injured by the absence of 
counsel. (People v. Rice, 73 Cal. 220, 221-222 [14 P. 851].) 
Moreover, defendant was represented by counsel at the re-
trial, and the error now complained of was never brought to 
the attention of the trial court. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and 
McComb, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J., Dissenting.-I do not agree with the holding 
of the majority that the arresting officers had reasonable 
cause to believe that defendant was guilty of a crime and 
that the search of his automobile was legal, and therefore 
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the heroin found therein was admissible in evidence against 
him. 
In the first place the officers had no reason to be more than 
merely suspicious that Hernandes was selling drugs, near 
whose home defendant had parked his car. The officers had 
arrested three persons on separate occasions who had told 
them they had obtained the drugs from Hernandes at his 
home. It does not appear what they were arrested for or that 
they had possession of or dealt in narcotics. 
Secondly, the officers had no reason whatsoever to believe 
that defendant was committing a crime. They knew nothing 
of him until they drove by Hernandes' house and saw de-
fendant in a parked car across the street. That certainly 
gave them no grounds to believe he was committing a crime 
even if we assume Hernandes was selling narcotics. Next, 
defendant got out of his car and went into the alley near 
Hernandes' home. Such conduct gives rise to no grounds 
for belief of the commission of a crime. There are many 
reasons why he may have gone into the alley wholly incon-
sistent with the theory that he had launched on a course of 
criminal conduct. Later, when defendant drove away in his 
car for a time and stopped his car, and reached toward the 
ground, the officers had no reason to believe he was picking 
up narcotics. There are likewise many reasonable causes for 
stopping having no connection with criminality. To say that 
it appeared that defendant had first gone to Hernandes' house 
and made arrangements' to buy some narcotics and later 
picked them up is pure speculation. If he were going to get' 
narcotics he would have gotten them when he went down the 
alley, since he apparently was unaware of any police surveil-
lance. The assumptions that must be made are too many and 
too great. It must be assumed that he went to Hernandes' 
house merely because he was near there; that Hernandes 
was selling narcotics; and that he picked up narcotics from 
the base of the tree although it was not known whether he 
picked up anything. The majority opinion states he was act-
ing in a furtive Inanner but there is nothing to show that he 
was acting furtively or skulking. There is no more here than 
there was in People v. Martin, 46 Ca1.2d 106 [293 P.2d 52], 
where two men were searched merely because they were in a 
car parked in lovers' lane. I refer to my discussion there 
(46 Ca1.2d ] 08) as being clearly applicable to the case at bar. 
Because the evidence against defendant was obtained as 
the result of an illegal search, I would reverse the judgment. 
